This paper deals with generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) in Banach spaces. We prove an existence result for normalized equilibria of jointly convex GNEPs and then propose an augmented Lagrangian-type algorithm for their computation. A thorough convergence analysis is conducted which considers the existence of subproblem solutions as well as feasibility and optimality of limit points. We then apply our investigations to a class of multiobjective optimal control problems which are governed by a linear partial differential equation and provide some numerical results to demonstrate the performance of the method.
Introduction
We consider the following generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Let N ∈ N be the number of players, each in control of a variable x ν ∈ X ν , where X ν is a (real) Banach space. We write X := X 1 × . . . × X N for the strategy space of all players. In the following, x −ν denotes the strategies of all players except the ν-th player, and X −ν the corresponding strategy space. We use the notations x = (x ν , x −ν ) and X = X ν × X −ν to emphasize the role of player ν's variable x ν . Each player ν attempts to solve the optimization problem minimize
Here, θ ν : X → R denotes the objective or utility function of player ν and F ⊆ X is a nonempty closed convex set. We will also assume that the objective functions θ ν (·, x −ν ) are convex and continuously differentiable for any given x −ν ; in this setting, the GNEP (1) is usually called jointly convex. Note that if F = F 1 × . . . × F N for closed convex sets F ν ⊆ X ν , then (1) reduces to the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) where each player attempts to solve minimize x ν ∈Xν θ ν (x ν , x −ν ) subject to x ν ∈ F ν .
In the past years a substantial amount of research has been conducted for GNEPs in finite dimensions, particularly for the jointly convex case. For a broad overview of the finitedimensional case we refer the reader to the survey papers [10, 12] . However, until now there is not much literature about infinite-dimensional GNEPs and their applications. In [6] Carlson extended the work of Rosen [30] to infinite dimensional games with strategies in Banach spaces. He provided conditions for existence and uniqueness of normalized Nash equilibriums. Some work has been done for standard NEPs in certain specific problem settings [5, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33] . For GNEPs, we are only aware of the papers [8, 13, 14] , the latter two of which are confined to an optimal control setting. It is not difficult to see that GNEPs of this type can be reformulated to fit into our general framework (1) . In the optimal control setting, each player has a control variable and the players' problems are coupled via the (joint) state variable which is the unique solution of a linear PDE. Working in the reduced formulation, we can simply define F as the set of all admissible controls where the corresponding state satisfies the given state constraints (if any), see also Section 6.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper which considers "generic" jointly convex GNEPs in infinite dimensions is [8] , where a relaxation method is presented. The aim of the present paper is to discuss some theoretical background on GNEPs in infinite dimensions and to provide an alternative algorithm. Our main approach is to apply an augmented Lagrangian (or multiplier-penalty) scheme to eliminate some or all of the constraints in (1) and therefore reduce the GNEP to a sequence of "easier" problems. This idea is not completely new: in [18] , an augmented Lagrangian method was presented for finite-dimensional GNEPs. Furthermore, in [20] an augmented Lagrangian method for optimization problems in Banach spaces was considered. Motivated by the promising results of these two works, we want to combine them and extend the given approaches to infinite-dimensional GNEPs in a general setting. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we deal with some preliminary results like existence of solutions of the GNEP and state the KKT-conditions of the considered problem. Section 3 contains a detailed description of our proposed multiplier-penalty method. Section 4 is dedicated to the convergence analysis, where we cover solvability of the arising penalized subproblems as well as feasibility and Nash optimality of every weak limit point generated by the presented algorithm. Section 5 leads us to strong convergence of the primal iterates and weak-* convergence of the corresponding multiplier sequence under certain regularity assumptions. Since some well-known applications of jointly convex GNEPs are given in the optimal control setting, a description how these type of problems fit in our convergence analysis is given Section 6, where we also include some numerical results. Section 7 contains some final remarks.
Notation: Throughout the paper, X and Y are Banach spaces, and we denote strong and weak convergence by → and , respectively. Moreover, duality pairings are written as ·, · , scalar products in Hilbert spaces as (·, ·), and norms are denoted by · with an appropriate subscript to emphasize the corresponding space (e.g. · X ). If S is a nonemtpy closed convex subset of a Hilbert space, we denote by P S and d S the projection and distance function to S, respectively. The partial derivative with respect to x ν is denoted by D x ν .
Preliminaries
This section is dedicated to the existence of solutions of the jointly convex GNEP and its KKT conditions. Before we analyze these two topics we want to recall the definitions of generalized Nash equilibria and normalized equilibria first.
Equilibria and Normalized Equilibria
For the definition of the two types of equilibria, recall that F is the joint constraint set of all players. For a given point x −ν ∈ X −ν , we write
for the feasible set of player ν's optimization problem. Note that this set might be empty for some (or many) x −ν . If we are dealing with a standard NEP, then F ν is independent of x −ν , see (2) . Hence, in that case, F ν is always nonempty.
Definition 2.1. Letx ∈ F be a feasible point. We say thatx is a (a) generalized Nash equilibrium or simply a solution of the GNEP if, for every ν,
Note that every normalized equilibrium is also a generalized Nash equilibrium, which can be seen by inserting points of the form y := (y ν ,x −ν ) into (4). The converse however is not true in general. For NEPs, both concepts are equivalent.
The existence of Nash equilibria is a rather delicate topic, even when restricted to standard NEPs or finite-dimensional problems. Most existence results [1, 3, 10, 25 ] assume (i) compactness of the set F, and (ii) appropriate continuity of the functions θ ν .
In the infinite-dimensional setting, condition (i) effectively forces us to work in the weak topology of the underlying space; however, this introduces certain problems with condition (ii), since few functions are actually continuous in the weak topology. Note that (weak) lower semicontinuity of θ ν with respect to x ν is not enough for existence: consider, for instance, the NEP given by
where x, y are the respective player variables. Then both objective functions are continuous and convex with respect to the corresponding variable, but θ 1 is not continuous with respect to y. It is easily verified that this problem does not admit a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, the compactness of F is also hard to relax, even in seemingly "good" cases. For instance, the unconstrained NEP [10, Example 4.5] given by
where x, y again are the respective player variables, does not admit a Nash equilibrium, even though both objective functions are strongly convex, and uniformly so with respect to the rival's variable. It follows from the above observations that a careful approach to the existence of Nash equilibria is necessary in our setting. To this end, we consider the existence of normalized equilibria, and define the Nikaido-Isoda (NI) function [26] Ψ(x, y) :
It is evident that a pointx ∈ F is a normalized equilibrium if and only if
which is equivalent tox being a solution of the maximization problem
Problems of the type (6) are usually referred to as equilibrium problems [16, 17] . Taking into account the existence theory for equilibrium problems, we are prompted to make the following assumption. Before we discuss this assumption, let us first give a direct consequence which is an existence theorem for normalized equilibria. The assumption that Ψ is weakly lower semicontinuous (lsc) with respect to x arises naturally from the Ky-Fan theorem. However, in general, this is a nontrivial assumption due to the minus sign in (5) . Clearly, a sufficient condition is the weak lower semicontinuity of the functions
for all ν and fixed y ν , which can be expected to hold in certain applications. It is also easy to verify that Assumption 2.2 is always satisfied in the optimal control framework from [13, 14] ; some examples will be given in Section 6.
Cones, Convexity and the KKT Conditions
For a nonempty convex set S and a point x in some Banach space (e.g. X), we denote by
the radial cone (or cone of feasible directions) and the tangent cone of S at x, respectively. Furthermore, we write
for the dual and polar cones of S. We now consider a special case of (1) where the constraint set F is given by
Here, the function g : X → Y represents the joint constraints (i.e. the constraint that couples the players' individual strategies), Y is assumed to be a Banach space, and K ⊆ Y is a nonempty closed convex cone. The set C denotes the players' individual constraints which are given by
To make the feasible set F convex and the GNEP a jointy convex one, recall that the cone K induces the order relation
which allows us to extend various familiar concepts from finite-dimensional optimization theory to our setting. For instance, we say that g is concave if
holds for all x, y ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1]. Other notions which involve an order such as increasing, decreasing or convex functions are also defined in a straightforward way. For instance, the distance function
where the inequality uses the convexity of K. It turns out that concavity of g with respect to K is the appropriate condition to ensure the convexity of the set F. This result along with some other useful observations is formulated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. Assume that g : X → Y is concave. If m : Y → R is convex and decreasing, then m • g is convex.
In particular:
.
(c) The set F = {x ∈ C : g(x) ∈ K} is convex.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ X and
by the concavity of g. Applying m on both sides yields
where we used the monotonicity and the convexity of m. Hence, the real-valued mapping m • g is convex in the usual sense. Assertion (a) now follows because d K is decreasing (see above) and convex [2, Cor. 12.12] . Similarly, for (b), the function y → λ, y with λ ∈ K • is obviously a convex function, and it is decreasing because λ, k ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K. Finally, for (c), note that
The second set is a lower level set of the convex function d K • g. Hence, F is convex.
We now discuss the KKT conditions of the GNEP.
hold for all ν.
The connection between the GNEP and its KKT conditions is well-known and essentially follows from the fact that the KKT system of the GNEP is just the concatenation of the KKT systems of each player. Since the player problems are convex, it follows that KKT points are always solutions of the GNEP. Moreover, ifx is a solution of the GNEP and an appropriate constraint qualification is satisfied, then there are multipliersλ
is a KKT point of the GNEP. In this case, the joint constraint yields separate multipliersλ ν for each player. For normalized equilibria (cf. Definition 2.1), it is possible to obtain a stronger notion of KKT points, cf. [6] . To this end, recall thatx is a normalized equilibrium if and only if Ψ(x, y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ F or, equivalently, ifx solves the concave maximization problem (7) . Assuming a suitable constraint qualification, which will be given later, for the set F, this problem is equivalent to its KKT conditions, which are given by
where D y is the derivative with respect to y. Recalling the definition of the NI function and the product form of the set C, we get
, and the first inclusion can be reformulated as
+ for all ν. In other words,x satisfies the KKT conditions from Definition 2.5 withλ ν :=λ for each ν, i.e. the multiplier is the same for every player.
The Multiplier-Penalty Method
The method which we present in this section aims to compute normalized equilibria of GNEPs whose constraint set has the form (8) with g : X → Y a concave operator. For the construction of the method, we assume that there is a (linear and continuous) embedding e : Y → H for some Hilbert space H, and that K H ⊆ H is a closed convex cone with e −1 (K H ) = K. Hence, we have
Moreover, we use the Moreau decomposition theorem, which can be stated as follows.
Lemma 3.1. Every y ∈ H can be uniquely written as y = y + + y − with y + ∈ K H , y − ∈ K
• H , and y + ⊥ y − . Moreover, we have y + = P K H (y) and
In the following, (·) − and (·) + will always denote the projections from the Moreau decomposition. We now turn to the multiplier-penalty method for the GNEP (1). The main idea of the method is to replace the (supposedly difficult) GNEP by a sequence of standard NEPs which include the constraint g within a penalty term. For the formal description of the method, we define the Lagrangian of player ν as
and the corresponding augmented Lagrangian as
Recall that (·) − is the distance to K H by the Moreau decomposition. Moreover, we note that there are other variants of L ρ in the literature. However, these differ from (12) only by an additive constant (with respect to x). For the definition of our penalty updating scheme, we also define the utility function
This enables us to formulate our algorithm as follows. of the NEP consisting of the minimization problems
(S.3) Update the multiplier estimate to
holds, set ρ k+1 := ρ k . Otherwise, set ρ k+1 := γρ k .
(S.5) Set k ← k + 1 and go to (S.1).
Some comments are due. First, note that we consider the case k = 0 separately in Step 4, since w k−1 and ρ k−1 are not defined for k = 0. This treatment has no influence on our convergence theory. Secondly, let us emphasize the importance of the sequence (w k ) in the above method. It is best to think of w k as a safeguarded analogue of λ k whose boundedness is enforced by requiring that w k ∈ B for all k. This simple fact will be crucial for our convergence analysis. Note that similar bounding schemes have been used, e.g., for augmented Lagrangian methods in nonlinear optimization [4] , and that the resulting algorithm possesses strictly stronger convergence properties than the classical augmented Lagrangian method (which uses the possibly unbounded sequence w k := λ k ), see also the example in [19] .
We now consider the subproblems occurring in Algorithm 3.2, which we refer to as the augmented NEPs. Note that we have not specified what constitutes an "approximate KKT point" in Step 2. Before we make this more precise, let us introduce the notation
for the utility function of player ν in the augmented NEP at iteration k. Therefore, x ν k+1
should be an approximate KKT point of
). This is reflected in the following assumption. Assumption 3.3. We have x k+1 ∈ C for all k and there is a zero sequence
for all ν and k.
The above is a fairly natural assumption which basically asserts that x k+1 is an approximate stationary point of the subproblem, and the degree of inexactness vanishes as k → ∞. Note that we assumed that each iterate x k+1 satisfies the additional constraint x ∈ C exactly. This assumption is not strictly necessary for our analysis, but it is nevertheless convenient and usually satisfied in practice since the set C is assumed to consist of "simple" constraints.
Convergence to Nash Equilibria
We now analyze the convergence properties of Algorithm 3.2. In finite-dimensional optimization, a standard way of stating convergence theorems is to assert optimality for any accumulation point of the sequence of iterates. Since we are dealing with possibly infinite-dimensional spaces, it is more natural to consider the case of weak limit points. The resulting convergence theorems obviously cover the case where the sequence (x k ) has a strong limit point, since any such point is also a weak limit point. Throughout this section, we will make extensive use of Assumption 2.2 which asserts the weak lower semicontinuity of the Nikaido-Isoda function with respect to x. As we will see, this condition is not only useful for the existence of equilibria, cf. Theorem 2.3, but also implies certain convergence properties for our Algorithm 3.2.
Before we proceed, recall that g : X → Y is assumed to be concave with respect to K. In the context of our multiplier-penalty method, we used the embedding e : Y → H into the Hilbert space H and the closed convex cone K H ⊆ H with e −1 (K H ) = K. In this setting, it is quite easy to see that concavity of g with respect to K is equivalent to concavity of e • g with respect to K H . This should be kept in mind when applying results related to convexity such as Lemma 2.4.
Before we proceed, we give an auxiliary result. 
Existence of Subproblem Solutions
In every iteration of Algorithm 3.2, we have to solve the augmented NEP for the given values w k and ρ k . Since the existence of Nash equilibria is not trivial in general (see also the example in Section 2.1), we want to state a result regarding this question.
where Ψ is the usual NI function. Then Ψ k is weakly lsc with respect to x in view of Assumption 2.2 and Lemma 4.1. Hence, as in Theorem 2.3, there is a pointx ∈ C with Ψ k (x, y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ C. We claim thatx is a solution of the penalized NEP (14) . To this end, let µ be an arbitrary player index and let y µ ∈ C µ . With y := (y
. This completes the proof. Lemma 4.2 yields the existence of solutions of the subproblem for a set C that is weakly compact. If C is not weakly compact (e.g. unbounded), then the existence of penalized Nash equilibria becomes much more complicated. In theory, an appropriate form of coercivity should yield the existence of solutions of the subproblems, but this is a rather delicate topic due to the involved nature of NEPs and GNEPs, see the discussion in Section 2 and in [10] .
Convergence to Nash Equilibria
The aim of this section is to show feasibility and optimality of every weak limit point of the sequence (x k ) generated by Algorithm 3.2. We start by addressing feasibility. Lemma 4.3. Every weak limit point of (x k ) is feasible.
Proof. Recall that g − H measures the distance of g(x) to K H . Exploiting the properties of a distance function we get that g − H is convex and continuous, hence weakly lower semicontinuous. Let us first consider the case where (ρ k ) remains bounded. The penalty updating scheme (15) yields
)) → 0, and the result follows. We now assume that ρ k → ∞, and define h k (x) as in Lemma 4.1. Let x k+1 Kx for some K ⊆ N and assume thatx is infeasible, i.e. g − (x) H > 0. Since F is nonempty, there is a point y ∈ F, and we get lim inf
Hence, there is a constant c 1 > 0 such that h k (x k+1 ) − h k (y) ≥ c 1 for all k ∈ K sufficiently large. Since h k is convex and continuously differentiable by Lemma 4.1, it follows that
for all k ∈ K sufficiently large. Now, let (ε k ) be the sequence from Assumption 3.3. Then
where Ψ is the NI-function from (5). By Assumption 2.2, Ψ is weakly lsc with respect to the first argument; hence, there is a constant c 2 ∈ R such that Ψ(x k+1 , y) ≥ c 2 for all k ∈ K. This together with (17) implies
and therefore contradicts ε k → 0.
The feasibility of the iterates or their (weak) limit points is obviously a crucial issue for the success of Algorithm 3.2, since the method is essentially a penalty-type method. Before proving the optimality of weak limit points, we first need a technical lemma which will also be of use later on.
Lemma 4.4. We have lim inf k→∞ λ k+1 , g(x k+1 ) ≥ 0.
Proof. Using the Moreau decomposition, we obtain
Now, if (ρ k ) is bounded, then (15) implies
But the latter is obviously equal to λ k+1 − w k H /ρ k . Therefore, λ k+1 − w k H → 0, which implies the boundedness of (λ k+1 ) in H as well as λ k+1 2 H − (λ k+1 , w k ) = (λ k+1 , λ k+1 − w k ) → 0. Hence, the desired result follows from (18) . We now assume that ρ k → ∞. Note that (18) is a quadratic function in λ. A simple calculation therefore shows that
This completes the proof.
Exploiting the feasibility from Lemma 4.3 and the result from Lemma 4.4 we are now able to prove that every weak limit point of (x k ) is a normalized equilibrium of the GNEP.
Theorem 4.5. Every weak limit point of (x k ) is a normalized equilibrium of the GNEP.
Proof. Let x k+1 Kx for some K ⊆ N (recall thatx is feasible by Lemma 4.3), and let y ∈ F be any point. An easy calculation shows that
where we used the convexity of θ ν with respect to x ν in the last estimate. Summing this inequality over all ν and using the convexity of x → λ k+1 , g(x) by Lemma 2.4 yields
Taking the limit k → K ∞ on both sides and using Lemma 4.4, ε k → 0 as well as the weak lower semicontinuity of Ψ with respect to the first argument, we see that Ψ(x, y) ≤ 0. Since y ∈ F was arbitrary, we conclude thatx is a normalized equilibrium.
Further Convergence Results
In this section we deal with further convergence results under stronger assumptions than those used in Section 4. After establishing an auxiliary result we prove two central results: (i) the strong convergence of the primal iterates to the unique normalized equilibrium, and (ii) the weak-* convergence of the multiplier sequence. For the remainder of this section, let F : X → X * be given by
It is well-known and easy to verify that the normalized equilibria of the GNEP can be characterized by means of the variational inequality
We refer the reader to [9] for a proof of this relationship in finite dimensions which directly extends to the infinite-dimensional case. Alternatively, one may simply observe that (19) is the first-order necessary condition of the concave maximization problem (7).
Strong Convergence of the Primal Iterates
Theorem 5.1. Assume that X is reflexive and that F is strongly monotone on C, i.e. there is a c > 0 such that
Then there is a unique normalized equilibriumx of the GNEP. Moreover, if Assumption 3.3 holds, then x k →x.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness ofx for the equivalent variational inequality (19) follow from standard arguments, see, e.g., [21] . For the proof of convergence, we first show that
Concatenating these relations for all ν and using the formula (12) of the augmented Lagrangian yields
where
* (w k + ρ k g(x)) − , we see that F k is the sum of the strongly monotone function F and the gradient of the convex function x → (ρ k /2) (g(x) + w k /ρ k ) − 2 H . Hence, F k is strongly monotone for all k with the same modulus c as in (20) . This yields
Recall that d K H is monotonically decreasing by (10). This implies (w
) is bounded, and we obtain the existence of a c 1 > 0 with c x k+1 −x 2 X ≤ c 1 x k+1 −x X . This yields the boundedness of (x k ). We now prove the strong convergence of (x k ) tox. Since (x k ) is bounded and X is reflexive, it follows from Theorem 4.5 that x k x. Now, using (20) , it follows that
x, we see that F (x), x k+1 −x → 0. Hence, to conclude the proof, it suffices to show that lim sup k→∞ F (x k+1 ), x k+1 −x ≤ 0. Using (21) and the definition of λ k+1 , we see that
Therefore, it suffices to show lim sup k→∞ r k ≤ 0, where
is convex. This yields r k ≤ λ k+1 , g(x) − g(x k+1 ) and, hence, r k ≤ − λ k+1 , g(x k+1 ) . Therefore, the result follows from Lemma 4.4.
Convergence of the Multipliers
Having proved the strong convergence of the primal iterates, in the following theorem we want to show convergence of the multiplier sequence. Recall that the radial cones R C , R K to C and K are defined in Section 2.2.
Theorem 5.2. Let Assumption 3.3 be satisfied. If x k →x and the Zowe-Kurcyusz regularity condition
is satisfied, then (λ k ) is bounded in Y * . Furthermore, every weak- * limit point of (λ k ) is a Lagrange multiplier corresponding tox.
Proof. By Assumption 3.3 and Lemma 4.4, we have
with a zero sequence (ε k ) ⊆ X * and λ k+1 ∈ K • . Sincex is feasible (Lemma 4.3), this implies the second statement. We now show the boundedness of (λ k ) in Y * . By [35, Thm. 2.1], there is an r > 0 such that 
Moreover, by (23) ,
We now use the fact that both λ k , g(x k ) and ε k−1 + ϕ k − F (x k ), w are bounded from below independently of w, which is an easy consequence of (23) and ε k → 0. Putting together (24) and (25), we obtain
for some constant c > 0. This implies
Note that the above result obviously remains true if we assume that x k → Kx on a subset K ⊆ N. In this case, we get the boundedness of (λ k ) K in Y * and the same assertion about weak-* limit points of this subsequence.
Applications
In the following we give some applications and numerical examples for Algorithm 3.2. Optimal control problems state a suitable problem class for infinite-dimensional generalized Nash equilibrium problems. Therefore, we have chosen two examples of this problem class from the literature. The first example is a state constrained elliptic optimal control problem. First we give a detailed overview of this example and analyse in detail why this type of problem is suitable for our convergence analysis. After that, we examine another example that is control constrained only.
All implementations in this section were done in FEniCS [22] using the DOLFIN [23] Python interface and the domain Ω = (0, 1)
2 . Unless stated otherwise, we choose ρ 0 = 1.0, τ = 0.1 and γ = 10 as the parameters for the algorithm.
Let us introduce a slight change of notation for this section. In the optimal control setting the players' strategies x ν ∈ X ν are called the controls u ν ∈ L 2 (Ω). The so called state y ∈ Y is in general the solution of a PDE constraint that is dependent of the players controls u = (u ν , u −ν ). Here Y depends on the kind of partial differential equation. Each player's cost functional in this context is denoted by J ν (y, u ν ).
State-Constrained Elliptic Optimal Control Problems
Let us start with a multiobjective optimal control problem including tracking type cost functionals and elliptic PDE constraints as well as state constraints. Problems of this type have also been investigated in detail in [13] where a Moreau-Yosida regularization has been used to handle the state constraints. Each player ν is equipped with a cost functional J ν (y, u), where the state y is dependent on the decisions
, be a bounded domain with C 1,1 -boundary Γ. Then player ν wants to minimize
over all (y, u
(Ω) subject to the partial differential equation and pointwise control and state constraints
where A is a suitable elliptic differential operator (e.g. A = −∆) and U 
we get the reduced formulation of the optimal control problem that coincides with the definition of a jointly convex GNEP:
In the notation of our abstract setting (1), (8), we have C = U ad , C ν = U ν ad for every ν, g(u) = Su − ψ, and K is the nonnegative cone in C(Ω). The feasible set F as defined in (8) takes on the form F = {u ∈ U ad : Su ≥ ψ} and is closed, bounded, and convex. The Nikaido-Isoda function of the GNEP is given by
where w = (w ν , w −ν ) and u, w ∈ L 2 (Ω). The next lemma gives us the weak lower semicontinuity of the corresponding Nikaido-Isoda function, i.e. Assumption 2.2 is satisfied. Proof. The result follows from the weak lower semicontinuity of the norm and the compactness of the solution operator S, i.e. weakly convergent sequences u k u are mapped onto strongly convergent sequences Su k → Su.
Lemma 6.1 has a number of important consequences. First, the weak lower semicontinuity of Ψ together with the weak compactness of F implies the existence of a normalized Nash equilibrium by Theorem 2.3. Moreover, it follows that the augmented Lagrangian subproblems generated by Algorithm 3.2 always admit solutions (Lemma 4.2) and every weak limit point of the sequence of controls (u k ) is a normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP (Theorem 4.5).
Strong Monotonicity of the Mapping F
We now show that the mapping F induced by the GNEP (28) is strongly monotone in the sense of Theorem 5.1. This function is given by
Recall that strong monotonicity of F implies the strong convergence of the whole sequence (u k ) to the unique normalized Nash equilibriumū.
Lemma 6.2. The operator F is strongly monotone.
Proof. Splitting the cost functional J ν into two parts
and F 2 defined similarly. For the first part, we use Su = N ν=1 S ν u ν and obtain
We now analyze F 2 and set α := min{α 1 , . . . , α N } > 0. Then
and the proof is complete.
Let us remark here that the Tikhonov terms in the objective functions are of great importance since they yield the strong monotonicity of the operator F . In particular, F 1 (u) is only monotone and not strongly monotone since there is no constant c > 0 with
For instance, if u k 0 and u k L 2 (Ω) = 1, then Su k → 0 by the compactness of S, yielding a contradiction.
Existence and Convergence of Multipliers
Note that the GNEP (28) admits a normalized equilibrium by Lemma 6.1 and Theorem 2.3. Denoting byū such an equilibrium, we obtain a corresponding optimal stateȳ = Sū. Using a suitable constraint qualification, we can furthermore establish the existence of a Lagrange multiplierλ. To this end, we use the following Slater condition. Assumption 6.3. We assume that there areû ∈ U ad and σ > 0 such that
The above assumption essentially boils down to Sû − ψ lying in the interior of the nonnegative cone of Y . Note that Y = H 1 (Ω) ∩ C(Ω) and, therefore, the nonnegative cone has a nonempty interior (as opposed to spaces such as L 2 (Ω)). Furthermore, since S is linear, it is easy to see that Assumption 6.3 is equivalent to the linearized Slater condition ∃u ∈ U ad : Sū(x) + S(u −ū)(x) ≥ ψ(x) + σ, e.g. by taking u :=û withû as in (30) . The linearized Slater condition in turn implies the Zowe-Kurcyusz regularity condition which we used in Section 5 (see [34, p. 332] ). The above discussion implies two things: first, the optimal control and state (ū,ȳ) admit a Lagrange multiplierλ ∈ C(Ω) * such that the first-order necessary conditions
are satisfied for all ν, cf. [7] and the discussion in Section 2.2. Here,p ν ∈ W 1,s , 1 < s < N/(N − 1), is the adjoint state of player ν, and the inequalityλ ≤ 0 has to be understood as λ , ϕ M(Ω),C(Ω) ≤ 0 for all ϕ ∈ C(Ω) with ϕ ≥ 0. In other words,λ lies in the polar of the nonnegative cone of C(Ω).
The second implication of the Slater condition (or, equivalently, of the Zowe-Kurcyusz condition) is that the assertions of Theorem 5.2 hold, i.e. the multiplier sequence (λ k ) generated by Algorithm 3.2 is bounded in C(Ω) * and each of its weak- * limit points is a Lagrange multiplier satisfying the optimality system (31) . Now, let us briefly consider the subproblems which occur in every iteration of the algorithm. We know that, by Lemmas 6.1 and 4.2, these problems always admit a Nash equilibriumū k . Since the problem is convex and control constrained only, firstorder necessary optimality conditions can be established without any further regularity assumptions. Settingȳ k := Sū k , there exist unique adjoint statesp ν k ∈ H 1 (Ω) which satisfy (compare with (31)) the system
A * pν
for all ν.
Summary of the Convergence Properties
We can associate with each iterate u k and its state y k = Su k the adjoint states p
, where G := ES and E is the canonical embedding from 
Numerical Results
In the following let us report about numerical results. As a test problem, we chose the four-player game presented in [13] , which is a special instance of the problem presented above, where Ω i = Ω for all i and f ≡ 1. The vector of Tikhonov-parameters is given by α = (2.8859, 4.3374, 2.5921, 3.9481), and the control constraints are defined by u The algorithm was stopped as soon as the quantities (ψ − y k ) + C(Ω) and |(λ k , y k − ψ)| drop below 10 −4 . The subproblems arising within the computation are solved by applying an active set method to the corresponding KKT conditions (32) . Table 6 .1 denotes some iteration numbers for different discretizations as well as the maximum penalty parameter ρ max reached during the given iterations. Note that the inner iterations are accumulated over the whole outer iterations. It is worth noting that the outer iteration numbers stay approximately the same as n increases. Moreover, the same holds for the final penalty parameter ρ max , which is equal to 10 10 for n ≥ 64. This observation suggests that our algorithm works quite well for the given optimal control problem.
The Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the numerical solution of Example 1. All figures depict results gained for a triangular mesh with n = 128 grid points. 
Control-Constrained Optimal Control Problems
The following example does not include constraints on the state. However this example is still of interest, since it has a known analytic solution, allowing us to do error estimates on our computed solution. Let N = 2 be the number of players. Every player wants to minimize the tracking-type functional (26) over all (y, u ν ) ∈ (H 1 (Ω) ∩ C(Ω)) × L 2 (Ω) subject to the PDE and control constraints 3.84e-3 1.04e-3 2.59e-4 6.50e-5 1.63e-5 ȳ − y h L 2 (Ω) 1.60e-3 4.01e-4 1.00e-4 2.50e-5 6.27e-6
Considering the consistent number of outer and also inner iterations and the quite good approximation of the Nash equilibrium, we can conclude that our algorithm works fine for this kind of problems.
Final Remarks
In this paper, we have introduced an augmented Lagrangian method for jointly convex GNEPs in Banach spaces. Under relatively weak assumptions, we obtain feasibility and optimality of every weak limit point of the generated sequence, and under additional regularity assumptions, we show strong convergence of the primal sequence and weak-* convergence of the multiplier sequence. The fact that we stated the problem in a quite general setting allows us to consider a broad range of applications to our setting, including the important field of multiobjective optimal control problems. Our numerical tests point out that our method works quite well for this kind of problems since it possesses good convergence properties and yields relatively high accuracy.
